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ABSTRACT
Following voting for George W. Bush in 2000, research shows that Muslim Americans
moved away from the Republican Party in 2004 in unprecedented numbers and continued
to support the Democratic Party in subsequent elections. To explain Muslim Americans’
shifting voting preference most studies employ quantitative survey methods and examine
associations between religious variables and partisanship. In this study, with a focus on
the 2016 Presidential election, I analyze qualitative data gathered from 22 in-depth
interviews in Memphis and develop a theoretical framework of emotional-cognition to
interpret Muslim Americans’ voting behaviors. I find that emotion played an important
role in shaping Muslim Americans’ political participation and voter choice. I suggest that
anti-Muslim rhetoric from then President-elect Trump and conservative pundits sent
emotion signals of fear to Muslim American voters who, in turn, became afraid for their
safety and livelihood, and such a fear drove them to vote for the Democratic Party.
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INTRODUCTION
With this election, Muslims really felt their backs were up against the wall, which
is unfortunate because I do not think that is the way people should live their
lives…. People got involved with this election because they were afraid… there is
a sense of urgency now because this is real… this is a very real situation and there
are hate crimes happening… -Irfan, an interviewee in my study (2017)
I was sitting across from Irfan, a thin young professional with a shock of thick black
hair that hangs over one eye. He kept brushing it away as he explained to me why he felt
compelled to vote for the Democratic candidate in the 2016 Presidential election. He
explained that Muslims were “afraid”, they “felt their backs were up against the wall” and
noted “a sense of urgency”. His explanation coincided and supported the narratives of all
22 of my respondents in this study of Muslim Americans’ voting behavior during the 2016
Presidential election. Incited by mainstream anti-Muslim sentiment (Bail 2015) my
respondents gave narratives that explicitly or implicitly indicated that Muslims perceived
a threat to the physical safety and livelihoods of themselves, their loved ones and the
Muslim American collective. My respondents spoke of themselves as members of a
collective group, using the terms “we” and “us.” They mentioned ‘Muslim bans’, hate
crimes, physical attacks, internment camps, locks on mosques, job discrimination, and
deportations. They spoke of injustices that they had heard about, injustices that they had
personally experienced and possible injustices that could still happen in the future.
Interwoven in all of their interviews I found a clear and distinct pattern: over and over
again, my respondents referred to fear.
Exit polls show that 87 percent of Muslim Americans voted for Hillary Clinton in
the 2016 Presidential election (Pfieffer 2016). This is consistent with the trend
established in 2004 when Muslims voted for John Kerry and continued during the 2008
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and 2012 elections when Muslims voted for Barack Obama (Graham 2015). The 2004
Presidential election marked a complete reversal of Muslim American partisanship from
the 2000 election in which the vast majority of Muslim Americans (72 percent) voted for
the Republican candidate George W. Bush in a move in which pollster John Zogby
described as “virtually unprecedented” (Graham 2015). The mass departure of Muslims
from the Republican Party has been attributed to the political climate which followed the
events of September 11, 2001 (Cainkar 2011; Bilici 2012; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009;
Barreto and Dana 2010; Bail 2015). Muslim Americans suffered the brunt of collective
discrimination and political marginalization. The ongoing ‘war on terror’ caused
candidates from both political parties to distance themselves from Muslim Americans,
and Muslims do not particularly benefit from the political policies of either party (Ayers
2007; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Barreto and Dana 2010). Yet Muslim Americans
continued to show up at the polls and vote for the Democratic Party in every election
since 2004. According to data gathered by Muslim American civil advocacy groups, the
number of Muslim American registered voters surpassed one million during the 2016
Presidential election, doubling the estimated 500,000 Muslims who registered in 2012
(Farivar 2016). The feat of registering over one million Muslim voters has been
publically accredited to aggressive non-partisan voter campaigns initiated by Islamic
civic advocacy groups such as the Council for American-Islamic Relations (CAIR)
(Farivar 2016). These voter campaigns were launched in December 2015 after then
President-elect Donald Trump called for a ban on Muslim immigrants.
Persistent anti-Muslim rhetoric from then President-elect Trump and the
Republican Party has been described as the “single most important issue since 9/11 for
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Muslim political advocates and leaders (Graham 2015). Kristin Szremski, spokeswoman
for American Muslims for Palestine, explained that anti-Muslim rhetoric had taken a
“psychological toll” on Muslim Americans (Dizard 2015). Indeed, Muslim Americans
had cause to be afraid. According to a report released by the Pew Research (2016), antiMuslim assaults in 2015 reached the highest levels since the months following the events
of September 11, 2001. The FBI reported 257 incidents of anti-Muslim hate crimes in
2015, marking 67 percent increase from the year before. Thus, when my respondents cite
fear as the reason they voted in the 2016 Presidential election they are explaining a
rational decision based on highly charged emotional dimensions
Existing literature on voter motivation cannot fully account for the unique
behavior of Muslim Americans. The most salient theories include rational-choice (Downs
1957), partisanship (Campbell 1964), and the role of religion in forming a collective
group consciousness, which in turn affects voter outreach and mobilization (Wolfinger
and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). Although there is research which
shows emotion plays a significant role in how voters perceive political issues and
campaign messages (Marcus et al. 2000; Brader 2005; Valentino et al. 2011), these
studies were quantitative analysis based on surveys, panel data or conducted in laboratory
settings. Further, these studies did not specifically investigate the role of emotion in voter
turnout. There has also been very little research specifically investigating the unique
sociological factors driving Muslim American political behavior. Ayers (2007) studied
the 2004 dramatic shift away from the Republican Party toward the Democratic Party and
found that religious salience was associated with increased support for Kerry, but
speculated that the element of fear functioned as the primary factor of Muslims voting for
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Kerry in 2004 due to Muslims taking negative cues from the Republican Party. He
concluded that future studies on Muslim voter choice should include “explanations and
measures connecting Muslims’ affective orientation of fear and their vote choice”
(p.196). Two other studies specifically on Muslim American voting behavior include
Barreto and Bozonelos’s (2009) research on Muslim American party identification and
the Barreto and Dana (2010) research on factors which influence Muslim Americans’
decision to vote. Both of these studies found that perceptions of discrimination were a
factor in determining voting behavior and partisanship, yet neither of these studies
investigated, nor even mentioned, the influence of emotion.
This study takes up Ayers (2007) call for research on the role of fear and voter
choice in understanding Muslim American voting behavior. This study also extends upon
existing quantitative research on the role of emotion, most specifically the studies of
Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) and Barreto and Dana (2010) which found that perceptions
of discrimination were a factor in partisanship but could not explain the underlying social
psychological reasons why. To this end, I bring theories of rational-choice and emotion
into dialogue by showing that perceptions of discrimination against a targeted group can
inspire fear in an individual who perceives a threat to his/her physical safety and/or
livelihood based on association with that group, even in the absence of affective ties to
the group. The fearful individual cognitively surveys the threat and then makes a rational
decision to ‘take action’ and vote.
I conducted 22 in-depth qualitative interviews with Muslim Americans living in
Memphis Tennessee, as well as the surrounding suburbs of Cordova, Germantown, and
Collierville. My goal was to investigate various possible sociological factors shaping

4

Muslim American political behavior, thus my initial question was “Did you vote in the
2016 Presidential election? Why or why not?” All 22 respondents provided narratives
which centered on fear and anxiety as they discussed their own individual voting
behavior as well as their perception of the voting behavior of other Muslim Americans.
Based on their narratives I conceptualized a framework of “emotional-cognition” which
demonstrates the interdependence of emotion and a rational social action. I show that
anti-Muslim rhetoric from the Republican Party and conservative pundits sent emotional
signals of fear to individual Muslim Americans. Muslim Americans felt threatened and,
in turn, voted against the Republican Party.
In the following section, I provide background research information which details
the dramatic Muslim American shift from the Republican Party to the Democratic Party
which began in 2004. It is important to understand the history of Muslim American
political behavior in order to get a sense of the profound need for continued research in
this area. I include demographic details to illustrate the bewildering heterogeneity of the
Muslim American community. Following that section, I then discuss the existing
literature on voter behavior including the rational choice model, partisan identity, voter
outreach, religious variables and the role of emotion. Acknowledging that the existing
theories of political motivation cannot fully account for the behavior of Muslim
Americans, I develop my theoretical framework of emotional-cognition, making
connections between an individual’s emotions and her/his rational choices. I then
discuss my research methods, data informing this study, and my findings. I conclude with
a discussion of the contributions and limitations of my study, as well as directions for
future research.
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND
As noted earlier, the stunning departure of Muslim Americans’ support for the
Republican Party is most likely attributed to Bush-era policies which made Muslims the
brunt of collective discrimination (Razack 2007; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Cainkar
2011; Bilici 2012). The experiences of Muslims in America post 9/11 are documented by
civil liberties violations, mass arrests, harassments, assaults and hate crimes (Cainkar
2011). Additionally, Bail (2015) found that after 9/11 anti-Muslim sentiment became
mainstreamed through media discourse spawning profoundly negative social and cultural
understandings of Islam. Furthermore, unlike other minority groups such as Jews,
African-Americans and Latinos, Muslims found themselves ostracized by candidates
from both political parties (Ayers 2007; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Barreto and Dana
2010.) Salam al-Marayati, executive director of the Muslim Public Affairs Council,
states “Presidential candidates are not willing to have their photo taken, they don't meet
with Muslim organizations, and they shy away from any issue that may link them to the
Muslim community” (Zoll 2008). In past decades, Jews, Blacks and Latinos have found
themselves targeted for political attack, but also received political outreach from the
opposing political party or candidate (Fraga and Leal 2004). This has not been the case
for Muslims (Barreto and Bozenolos 2009; Barreto and Dana 2010). Nevertheless,
Muslim Americans have continued to vote for the Democratic Party in increasing
numbers since 2004.
Before 2000
Before the attacks on September 11, 2001, there was little attention paid to
Muslim voting behavior (Ramadan 2005). It is assumed that Muslims traditionally had
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low levels of involvement in American politics. The surveys taken before 9/11 were only
examined after the events. Osman (2012) claims that the first attempts in organizing
Muslim American political behavior happened during the 1992 elections when a handful
of Muslim leaders and organizations recommended that Muslims vote for the Republican
candidate George W. Bush Sr. Other sources claim that while immigrant Muslims leaned
more Republican, African-American Muslims were more likely to be Democratic
(Graham 2015). The now defunct organization, American-Muslim Council (AMC) states
that Muslim Americans were split between the Democrats and Republicans for many
years until the 1996 election (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009). Their research refers to 1996
surveys taken by an Ethnic newspaper, Pakistan Link, and by the United Muslims of
America (UMA) which found that Muslims voted for Clinton over Dole. However,
Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) are quick to point out that those surveys are unreliable
because they are only published in Findley’s (2001) book and it is not clear how
representative those surveys were. Both sources catered to a South Asian demographic.
What is clear is that the 1996 election represents the first fledgling attempt by Muslim
activists at establishing a Muslim American voting bloc (Rose 2001). The movement
stumbled due to fierce debates within the Muslim community on whether or not Muslims
should even participate in the affairs of a secular Democracy. In the years between the
1996 and 2000 presidential elections, the debate fizzled as voices opposing Muslim
participation in American politics became a minority. Seeking to unify a disparate
Muslim American community, seven organizations joined forces to offer coordinated
advice for the 2000 presidential election: American Muslim Alliance (AMA), American
Muslim Caucus (AMC), American Muslim Council (AMC), Council on Arabic-Islamic
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Relations (CAIR), Council on Islamic Affairs, Muslim Public Affairs Council (MPAC)
and the Islamic Society of North America (ISNA) (Saeed 1998). The seven groups
together formed the American-Muslim Political Coordination Committee (AMPCC). By
the 2000 election a survey by CAIR indicated that 89 percent of Muslims “strongly” or
“somewhat” agree that Muslim Americans should participate in the political process
(Rose 2001). As a consequence, it was the 2000 presidential election in which Muslim
American voting first took on a profound importance.
2000 Election
Muslim Americans became a visible and vocal presence during the 2000 election
season. A coalition of Muslim American political advocacy groups developed a toolkit to
register voters, including a step-by-step voter instruction guide, “The American Muslim
Voter” which was issued to Muslim leaders and activists. Voter registration booths were
erected in mosques, Islamic schools and Muslim community centers. The election of
2000 would also be the first time Muslim clerics delivered invocations at both parties’
national conventions. Both presidential nominees held unprecedented meetings with
Muslim American leaders. However, it was George W. Bush who became the first
president to “publicly court the Arab-American community” (Jenkins 2016). George W.
Bush met with the AMPCC and addressed concerns over profiling and foreign policy
issues. Graham (2015) writes that Grover Norquist, the anti-tax crusader, urged George
W. Bush to court the Muslims, arguing that “Muslims are a socially conservative, familyoriented, business-friendly group that are a natural GOP constituency.” 1Also, as a
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Yet, it would be disingenuous to suggest that Muslims are uniformly conservative across all issues. When
it comes to foreign policy, Muslims lean to the left (Rose 2001; Read 2008). It is also important to note that
one third of Muslims identify as Black. African-Americans have been traditionally loyal to the Democratic
Party. Rose (2001) notes that during the 2000 election African American leaders bitterly complained that
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collective group, Muslims are socially conservative and share many of the same values of
the Republican Party (Graham 2015). The AMPCC formally endorsed George W. Bush
for president in October of 2000 (Findly 2001; Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Jenkins
2016). Muslim Americans campaigned and overwhelmingly voted for George W. Bush
and even donated money to his party (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009).
2004 and Beyond
The 2004 Presidential election would see the second Muslim American bloc vote
for Democrat John Kerry. Poole and Ali (2005) claim that 93 percent of Muslim
Americans voted for Kerry (compared to 72 percent which voted for Bush in 2000) and
that there was a 20 percent increase in Muslim voter registration. A more modest estimate
by CAIR found that 76 percent voted for Kerry. Research by Ayers (2007) shows that of
those Muslim Americans who supported Bush in 2000, only 15.9 percent supported him
in 2004. Ayers (2007) speculates that this shift is likely explained as a response to the
Bush era foreign and domestic policies which attributed to widespread fear and anxiety
among the Muslim populations. Ayers’ findings concur with the results of a 2007 report
by the Pew Research Institution which found that 53 percent of Muslims in the survey
believed that it was more difficult to be a Muslim in America after 9/11 and that the
Government ‘singled out’ Muslims for scrutiny and surveillance. These policies included
mass arrests, deportations, wiretapping of Muslim communities, the closing of Muslim
charities, visa holds, FBI interviews and increased profiling (Cainkar 2011). The

the AMPCC did not include representation from the Black Muslim community. However, this does not
mean that African-American Muslims are not affected and motivated by the same emotional components as
the larger Muslim population. I suggest that they are unique only because their distrust of the Republican
Party prevented them from voting with first, second and third generation immigrant Muslims in 2000 for
George W. Bush
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Department of Justice reported a 1,600 percent increase in hate crimes targeting Muslims
Americans with the majority involving U.S. government agencies (Read 2008).
Muslim Americans would continue voting Democrat for the 2008 and 2012
presidential elections, supporting Barack Obama at rate of between 80-90 percent, with
voter registration increasing every year (Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Barreto and Dana
2010). This happened despite the fact that post 9/11 political climate required both parties
to distance themselves from Muslims and neither party reached out to the Muslim
American community. In fact, Barack Obama’s campaign had two women wearing
headscarves removed from the stage during a campaign speech (Smith 2008). Barreto and
Dana (2010) expound on this incident stating “Rather than making an earnest stand in
defense of those who practice Islam, the Obama campaign attempted to hide any possible
connection to Muslims…Never before has a group of voters been subject to attacks and
slights by both major political parties, yet this has been the case for Muslim Americans
since 2001” (p. 157-158).
Yet, despite marginalization by both political candidates, Muslim Americans
mobilized during the 2016 Presidential election in unprecedented numbers, setting up
voter registration booths in mosques, Islamic schools and community centers across the
country. CAIR government affairs manager Robert McCaw explained “There are two
thousand mosques in this country, and we plan on printing out two thousand get-out-thevote posters” (Graham 2015). Politically active Muslims held workshops and passed out
pamphlets encouraging Muslim Imams (or preachers) to give sermons on the importance
of voting and participating in political life. Figure 1 shows how Muslim Americans
voted from 2000-2016. It is also important to point out that the amount of Muslims voting
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increased every election, doubling from 500,000 to over one million from 2012 to 2016
(Farivar 2016).

HOW MUSLIM AMERICANS VOTED
Democrat

Republican
89%

Independent

85%

76%

72%

74%

19%
8%

17%
7%

2000

2004

9%

11%

2%

4%

2008

2012

13% 13%

2016

Figure 1: How Muslim Americans Voted 2000-2016. Data is based on press releases
issued by CAIR describing exit polls of registered Muslim voters found on
www.cair.com
Not only did more Muslim Americans participate in the 2016 elections than ever
before, but interestingly, more Muslims actually voted Republican. In fact, exit polls also
show that three times more Muslims voted for Donald Trump in 2016 than for Mitt
Romney in 2012. Aziz (2016) speculates that Muslims who voted for Trump were not

endorsing him or

his values, but joining many other of their fellow Americans in a repudiation of the
political status quo of which they saw Hillary Clinton as part of. Jim Zogby, co-founder
and president of the Arab American Institute remarked “There are people who are
culturally Republican and simply cannot bring themselves to vote for a Democrat”
(Gaudiano 2016). I also suggest that some Muslims may have voted for Trump because
they were disillusioned about the foreign policies of the Democratic Party. In recent years
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Muslim majority countries have been ravaged by sectarian violence which many may
blame on the Obama administration.
The Muslim American Demographic
In studying the political mobilization of the Muslim community it is worth noting
the vast heterogeneity of the Muslim community. Islam is considered the fastest growing
religion in the United States with a population estimated between 2 and 5 million (Lipka
and Hackett 2017). Demographically, Muslims are far from a monolith. The Muslim
community is significantly more racially diverse than the greater American population as
a whole. According to the Pew Research Center (2011) more than 63 percent of firstgeneration Muslim Americans over the age of 18 were born abroad, 37 percent are
second-generation born in the United States while 15 percent are considered thirdgeneration Americans. Muslims born abroad come from at least 77 different countries,
with Pakistan being the largest country of origin at fourteen percent. While 12 percent
come from other South Asian countries, Middle Eastern and North African countries
represent 41 percent of foreign-born U.S. Muslims, or 26 percent of All Muslim
Americans total. 30 percent of Muslim Americans describe themselves as White, 23
percent as Black, 21 percent as Asian, 6 percent as Hispanic and 19 percent as other or
Mixed Race. In regards to education, 26 percent of Muslim Americans have graduated
from college while another 26 percent report that they are currently enrolled in college.
Tables 1 and 2 below are based on information gathered from the Pew Research 2011
Muslim American Project Survey (MAPS) and provide a snapshot of the vast diversity of
the Muslim American community.
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Table 1: Country of Origin of U.S Muslims in 2011
Country of Origin

%

United States
Middle East/North Africa
Pakistan
Other South Asian
Iran
Europe
Sub-Saharan Africa
Other

37
41
14
12
5
7
11
10

Note: Data is based on Pew Research Center Project MAPS (2011)
Table 2: Racial Composition of U.S. Muslims in 2011
Race

%

White
Black
Asian
Other/Mixed
Hispanic

30
23
21
19
6

Note: Data is based on Pew Research Center Project MAPS (2011)
Muslims as a Political Group
Ayers (2007) argues that Muslim American political participation “increased
exponentially after September 11, 2001” as they became targets of discrimination and
religious profiling (p.188). Read’s (2008) analysis of survey data supports Ayer’s finding
that Muslims are more highly politically integrated then previously assumed. By studying
data from the MAPS project, Pew Research Center and General Social Survey which
measures political involvement such as party affiliation, voter registration and contact
with politicians, Read (2008) found that Muslim Americans are slightly more likely than
the average American voter to have contacted a politician, and more likely to identify as
Democrat. Read (2008) also found Muslims who participated in the more organized
dimensions of Muslim life, such as frequently attending the mosque, were more likely to
13

be politically active. This finding suggests that involvement with a congregation
heightens group consciousness and stimulates political participation in order to address
issues facing the group as a collective.
Figure 2 demonstrates that while immigration accounts for the lower percentage
of registered voters compared to the average U.S. populations (Read 2008), Muslim
Americans are actually slightly more likely to have contacted a politician and more likely
to affiliate with the Democratic Party. Read (2008) also found that Muslim Americans
were more likely to “lean to the right” and are “slightly more conservative” than the
general public. According to Read’s study the majority of Muslim Americans (69
percent) oppose gay marriage and abortion (56 percent). Additionally, more Muslim
Americans (59 percent) believed that the federal government should do more “to protect
the morality of society”.

Figure 2: Muslim Americans’ Political Involvement as reported in Read’s (2008)
“Muslims in America” and published on www.Contexts.Org.
It has been nine years since Read’s 2008 data analysis, yet recent reports from
Muslim-American Civil Advocacy organizations on unprecedented Muslim voter turnout
indicate that Muslims are more politically active than ever (Farivar 2016).
14

LITERATURE REVIEW AND THEORIES OF VOTER MOTIVATION
Impact of religion and religiosity on political behavior and partisan identity
Voter turnout is the most common and possibly the most important form of
political participation in a democratic society (Wang 2013). Democracy is dependent on
the participation of its citizens to elect officials which serve the common good. Due to the
importance of voter participation scholars have devoted a considerable amount of
research determining the factors which motivate citizens to vote. Campbell (1964)
seminal work found that partisan identification is a major influence on the voting
behavior and voter choice. They argued that political partisanship is developed early in
life and reinforced by the family, culture and social environment. Further research has
shown that religious identification, self-reported degrees of religiosity and church
attendance are indicators of political behavior and partisanship (Wolfinger and
Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). While Protestants and Catholics
consistently vote Republican, Jewish congregants and African-American Christians vote
Democrat (Ayers 2007; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993).
On an individual level, conservative and orthodox adherents of Christian congregations
traditionally support the Republican Party while progressive adherents support the
Democratic Party. Yet, this broad generalization on the effect of heightened religiosity
does not hold true across all demographic factors. Women and minorities are more likely
to be Democrat despite level of religiosity (Tolleson-Rinehart and Perkins 1989;
Kaufmann 2002). Additionally, Jews, Black Christians and non-Christian minorities are
not more likely to become Republican as they become more religious (Ayers 2007).
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Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) point out that religiosity may have more bearing
on Christian denominations because they are demographically homogenous, tending to be
white, middle class and older. Similarly, Harris (1999) found that African-Americans
who attend black churches have a high sense of linked fate due to a shared history and
culture. Furthermore, other research indicates that religious institutions instill group
consciousness by bringing together individuals with similar life experiences, which could
allow for political mobilization. Jamal’s (2005) research on black churches suggest that
disenfranchised individuals with similar experiences and life trajectories come together
through religious institutions and form a political group consciousness.
Unlike other religious congregations the Muslim American community is vastly
heterogeneous. The Muslim American community is the only faith community that
cannot be represented by any majority race and boasts a population which expands across
the full educational and socio-economic spectrum (Younis 2009). Thus, natural divisions
and fractures along racial, ethnic, and socio-economic lines preclude the Muslim
American community from collectively aligning with one party over the other based on
demographic variables. Yet, despite the high demographic diversity of the Muslim
American community, members of the faith have undergone similar socialization
processes as other minority groups as victims of profiling and discrimination (Cainkar
2011; Grewal 2014; Bilici 2012).
Research also demonstrates that a religious variables are largely connected to the
efforts of political candidates on reaching out and catering to religious communities
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993). For example,
evangelicals and Christian Fundamentalists have become a major element in the
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Republican Party machine, while minority religious groups, such as Jewish congregants
and black Christians have historically been mobilized for the Democratic party (Wilcox
and Larson 2006; Campbell 2005). In contrast, Barreto and Dana (2010) argue that there
is effectively no outreach toward Muslim American communities, noting “both
Democrats and Republicans emphasize their support for Protestants, Catholics and Jews,
while distancing themselves from Muslims” (p. 160). In their study, which investigated
factors associated with the decision to vote or not to vote, Muslim Americans who stated
they had no preference for any political party were less likely to vote, demonstrating how
the lack of voter outreach can function to stifle political participation. In Ayers (2007)
study on the Muslim shift away from the Republican Party and toward the Democratic
party during the 2004 election, he questioned the future of Muslim political participation
in a climate “requiring all candidates to symbolically fight terror” and speculated that
Muslims may find themselves “alienated from all aspects of political life” (p.195). Yet,
this did not happen. Despite the failure of both political parties to reach out to the Muslim
community, Muslims have continued to vote and grow as a political group. In my next
section I examine past theories of rational choice and emotion, finding that an integration
of these two models provides the best explanation of Muslim American voting behavior.
Connecting Rational Choice and Emotion
The oldest and most influential model explaining voting behavior is Down’s 1957
seminal work using Rational Choice Theory, suggesting that individuals are selfinterested and make the decision to vote based on a cost-benefit analysis (Downs 1957).
If the voter perceives that the benefits of voting for a particular candidate is greater than
the costs then he/she will choose to vote for that individual. If the costs are greater than
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the benefits then the individual will abstain from voting. Other scholars have called
Rational Choice Theory into question and argued that it is impossible for the average
citizen to receive all relevant information necessary to facilitate an accurate cost-benefit
analysis (Wang 2013). Riker and Ordershook (1968) attempt to improve upon the
Downsian model by integrating social-psychological components. They posited that the
psychological gratification associated with being a good citizen and participating in a
democracy could motivate an individual to vote. Marcus (1988) is among the first to
specifically study emotion in political behavior delineating between positive social
emotions of enthusiasm against the negative social emotion of anxiety. Their research
holds that the positive emotion of enthusiasm derives from a feeling that the environment
is safe and that political conditions are stable. The negative social emotion of anxiety
results from a reaction to a possible threat in the environment. The negative emotion of
anxiety acts as motivator for the subject to act. This finding supports other research
which show that negative emotions such as anger, anxiety and fear are central motivators
of social action.
Jasper (1997; 1998) holds that emotion is implicit in all cognitive action. He
posits a theory of reactive and affective emotions to explain social movements. Jasper
(1997; 1998) coins the term “moral shock” to explain why individuals are triggered to
join social movements. Ritzer (2007) describes moral shock as “a sudden and deeply
emotional stimulus that causes an individual to come to terms with an issue which
challenges the values and morals already held by that individual” (p.223). Jasper (1997;
1998) refers to moral shock as a recruitment method which inspires individuals to join
social movements in the absence of social ties to those networks. The emotional process
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of moral shock involves reactive emotions such as outrage, anger, grief and fear. I find
that these are the exact emotions inspired by the post 9/11 political climate in which
Muslims are regarded with hostility and suspicion. Republican political policies blatantly
targeting Muslims inspire a sense of betrayal and outrage (Cainkar 2011). In this sense,
moral shock, instead of being a tool of recruitment, becomes a method of
disfranchisement. Jasper (1997; 1998) explains that reactive emotions are temporary and
fleeting, but I contend that Muslim Americans are under a consistent state of oppression
and discrimination which have culminated in an ongoing collective emotional state of
fear and anxiety. According to Jasper’s (1997; 1998) model, as reactive emotions
dissipate, affective emotions of love, loyalty and trust develop in order to sustain
commitment to the collective group. In my study, I found mixed results for affective
emotions of loyalty and trust, which I will extend upon in my results section.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF THIS STUDY
In my study I conceptualize an emotional-cognitive framework to explain Muslim
Americans’ voting behavior during the 2016 election. I argue that Muslim Americans live
under a consistent and perpetual barrage of anti-Muslim sentiment that I term “moral
disrupters”. I define moral disrupters as consistent and repetitive acts which upset the
individual’s understandings of themselves and their reality. During the 2016 election
negative emotions of anxiety and fear were exacerbated by consistent anti-Islamic
rhetoric from Donald Trump and conservative media pundits. For instance, Ted Cruz
suggested that police need to ‘patrol Muslim neighborhoods’ (Diamond 2016). Donald
Trump called for a temporary ban on immigration from Muslim countries (Phillip and
Hauslohner 2016) and stated to CNN’s Anderson Cooper that ‘Islam hates us’ (Schliefer
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2016). Moral disrupters trigger reflective and reactive emotions which include anger and
fear (Jasper 1997; 1998, Snow and Soule 2010). Reactive emotions are assumed to be
involuntary, temporary and fleeting, eventually giving way to the individual resolving to
do something about the perceived threat. The research shows that individuals are
motivated to join social movements to take up a cause, and, in turn, develop affective ties
to other group members who share a collective fear (Snow and Soule 2010, Jasper 1997;
1998). What I aim to account for in this study is how macro-level structures cause
negative reactive emotion through threats and hate rhetoric, motivating the individual
toward social action even in the absence of affective ties to the collective group. I use the
term ‘emotion signals’ to clarify what I am referring to. During the 2016 Presidential
campaign, the calls for ‘Muslim bans’ and deportation sent emotion signals of fear to
individuals from Muslim majority countries and practitioners of the Islamic faith, who, in
turn, process these negative emotions. As a result, the Muslim identity takes on a
heightened sense of salience as the identity that is targeted, threatened and called out over
and over again. In other social conditions individuals who happen to practice the Islamic
faith may otherwise be more aligned with their racial or ethnic identity or, as in the case
of second and third generation Muslims, see themselves as wholly integrated into the
national community. As a consequence of this heightened salience of identity, the
individual actor makes decisions based on the best interests of the group even in the
absence of affective emotions toward the group. An identity (or specifically the salience
of one identity over others) can be imposed upon the individual by macro-level structures
as well as the meanings attached to such identity. In the case of the 2016 election, thenPresident elect Donald Trump threatened Muslims with bans, deportation, and registries,
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thus it would have been rational for individual Muslims to vote for Hillary Clinton.
Figure 3 illustrates the pattern between emotion and rational components that I envision.

MORAL DISRUPTERS
Anti-Muslim rhetoric
Threats

EMOTION SIGNALS
Fear, Anger, Anxiety

EMOTION PROCESSING
Results in heightened salience of identity

COGNITIVE ADJUSTMENT
(Individual perceives threat
based on affiliation with group
identity)

SOCIAL ACTION
(Individual acts in best interests of
the group i.e. vote)

Figure 3
My theoretical model considers the unique social and cultural landscape of
Muslim Americans and thus incorporates a new theoretical perspective. Specifically, I
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aim to account for the rise of Muslim American voter turnout in a hostile political climate
despite low levels of outreach from political candidates, and lack of participation in
formal organizations. I suggest that this theoretical model can apply to other groups of
politically disenfranchised voters such as Latino immigrants and low-income AfricanAmerican conservatives who may feel inclined to vote for the Democratic Party in
response to discriminatory rhetoric from the Republican Party.
My research also seeks to elaborate on the findings of Barreto and Bozonelos
(2009) who used a quantitative analysis which referred to Downs (1957) seminal work on
instrumental rationality to argue that Muslim American identity with the Democratic
Party is a rational move given the Republican rhetoric regarding Islam and Muslims.
What Barreto and Bozonelos (2009) rational-choice model could not account for is the
role of emotion.
DATA AND METHODS
To understand the sociological factors of political participation among Muslim
Americans I conducted 22 semi-structured, in-depth qualitative interviews with Muslims
Americans in Memphis Tennessee as well as the surrounding suburbs of Cordova,
Collierville, and Germantown who are legally eligible to vote. The research was
exploratory, thus I focused on recurring themes and categories (Corbin and Strauss 1990).
Although I asked my respondents to discuss life experiences, attitudes and emotions
which affected their political behavior, partisanship and voter choice since the year 2000,
the young age of many of my respondents and the fact that many of my respondents were
first-time voters, prompted a specific focus on the 2016 election.
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Recruitment of Interviewees
Initially, I relied on my own identity as a Muslim American community member
to reach out to contacts from within my own social network. I sent emails and text
messages to my closest contacts. Five of my contacts, all women ranging from ages 3250 replied. I interviewed one contact in her home with her husband present. After her
interview concluded, I interviewed him. At the end of his interview, he immediately
contacted his friend and business partner whom I later interviewed over the phone. Using
the flyer that can be found in Appendix E, I was able to recruit four interviewees during
the Muslims-in-Memphis festival that took place at the Agricenter in Memphis Tennessee
on March 26, 2017. All four of these interviewees were young men who were manning
booths that represented the various mosques in the city of Memphis. I recruited three
more interviewees during the Palestine festival which took place at Overton Park in
Memphis Tennessee on April 29, 2017. I also used snowball sampling techniques for
recruitment, as many interviews ended with me acquiring contact information for another
potential interview candidate. As word of my research project spread, several members
of my community contacted me to indicate their willingness to be interviewed. One
contact turned out to still be in the process of gaining her citizenship. For this reason I
abandoned the interview.
In order to better capture the demographics of the Muslim American community,
I asked each of my respondents to describe their racial and ethnic heritage, prompting
them for ethnicity and generation status if they did not initially provide it. Table 3
provides a detailed list of my interview respondents and how they identified.
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Table 3: List of Interview Respondents
Pseudonym
Abdul
Ahmed
Aliyah
Ameer
Ayesha
Beverly
Dania
Irfan
Jannah
Mahdi
Mahmoud
Mona
Musa
Nadia
Nasser
Omar
Rabia
Salwa
Sharif
Sheyla
Tarek
Tehseen

Self-Reported Race/Ethnicity
Second-generation, Lebanese
First-generation, Palestinian
Second-generation African American
Second-generation, Palestinian
White convert
African-American Convert
Second-generation, Palestinian
Second-generation, Bengali
Second-generation, Mixed heritage
Second-generation, Malaysian
First-generation, Palestinian
Second-generation, Palestinian
White and Egyptian
Second-generation, Palestinian
White and Syrian
White American Convert
Second-generation, Pakistani
Second-generation, Palestinian
Second-generation, Egyptian
First-generation, Indonesian
Second-generation, Palestinian
Second-generation, Pakistani

Gender Age
Male
25
Male
54
Female 35
Male
29
Female 29
Female 50
Female 22
Male
26
Female 22
Male
22
Male
34
Female 39
Male
26
Female 26
Male
32
Male
26
Female 36
Female 37
Male
27
Female 38
Male
26
Female 22

Education Level
Graduate Student
Professional Degree
Professional Degree
Professional Degree
Professional Degree
Master’s Degree
Undergraduate Student
Master’s Degree
Undergraduate Student
Undergraduate Student
Professional Degree
Master’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Student
Master’s Degree
Graduate Degree
Doctorate Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Graduate Student
Bachelor’s Degree
Bachelor’s Degree
Undergraduate Student

Interviewing
I conducted interviews over a 5 month period in 2017. The interviews usually
lasted between 45 minutes and two hours. The majority of the interviews was conducted
in-person while 4 interviews took place on the telephone. In-person interviews were often
conducted in library study rooms in different areas of town which were convenient to the
interviewee. Several interviews took place in the respondent’s home over a cup of coffee.
Two interviews took place in a quiet café. One interviewee met me in the park and one
interview took place in my car. After assuring each respondent of confidentiality and
being granted consent (Appendix A), I digitally recorded each interview. For phone
interviews, I faxed or emailed the consent form prior to the interview. Additionally, I
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obtained oral consent at the beginning of each interview whether conducted in-person or
over the phone. The interview recordings were then transcribed using a professional
transcription service.
Data
Although the initial aim of this project was to investigate the possible sociological
factors which have shaped Muslim American voting behavior since the shift which
occurred in 2004, I ended up focusing on the 2016 election. This is due to the small size
of the sample, the young age of many of my respondents, and the fact that several of my
respondents were first-time voters. Focusing on the 2016 election I sought to examine the
broader social, religious and political context in which the current Muslim American
political identity is being formed. It became clear after the first two or three interviews
that my respondents focused on emotion as a driving factor of their political behavior.
My goal was to gather knowledge regarding the following:


What happened? Did the individual vote during the 2016 election? Why or Why
not? Who did they vote for? Why or Why not?



How did the individual explain their voting behavior? What sociological factors
played a significant role in shaping their behavior?
o How did religiosity and participation in the Muslim community impact the
individual’s voting behavior?
o How did affective feelings toward the Muslim community impact voting
behavior?
o What was the role of emotion in motivating the individual’s voting
behavior?
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Why did this happen? In light of the data I obtained from initial interviews, I
probed subsequent narratives with a focus on the role of emotion and
conceptualized a framework connecting emotion to rational choice.

Appendix D is the complete interview guide that I used to direct respondents during
the interview process. However, the semi-structured nature of the interviews allowed
me the flexibility to probe the narrative of the interviewee in order to ask follow-up
questions with the purpose of investigating and interpreting the role of various
sociological factors behind the participant’s social action of voting (or not voting). In
addition to conducting an open-ended interview, I also distributed a demographic
survey at the end of each interview (Appendix C). There was a 50 percent gender
distribution with 11 males and 11 females. 13 of my respondents (59 percent) were
between the ages of 22 and 29. 7 of my respondents (32 percent) were between the
ages of 30 and 49. 2 of my respondents (9 percent) were just barely over the age 50.
They were the ages of 50 and 54. 4 of my respondents (18 percent) reported an
income of less than 19,999. It should be noted that all 4 of these respondents were
students who still lived at home with parents. 9 respondents (41 percent) reported an
income between 20,000 and 49,999, 5 respondents (23 percent) reported an income
between 50,000 and 79,999, 2 respondents (9 percent) reported an income between
80,000 and 149,999 while 2 respondents (9 percent) reported an income of over
150,000. Table 4 includes descriptive data about my sample based on the
demographic survey of my participants. More detailed information regarding
race/ethnicity and education level can be found in Table 3 in the previous section.
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Table 4: Respondents Demographics
Total #

Total %

11
11

50
50

Total

22

100

22-29
30-49
50+

13
7
2

59
32
9

22

100

4
9
5
2
2

18
41
23
9
9

22

100

Gender
Male
Female

Age

Total
Income Level
Less than 19,999
20,000-49,999
50,000-79,999
80,000-149,000
More than 150,000
Total

Analytic Strategy
The interviews were recorded on a private device and then transcribed by a
professional transcription service. Pseudonyms were assigned to all transcripts of the
interviews as well as all demographic questionnaires. There was no identifying
information, such as real names or places, included on transcript copies. I used a
grounded theory approach in which the analysis of data focused on recurring themes and
concepts (Corbin and Strauss 1990). During the data analysis I quickly determined that
partisan identity was not a factor in the Muslim American voting behavior. I also noted
marked differences in attitudes of religiosity, and attachment to the mosque community
between male and female respondents. I also noted that narratives discussing the social
emotion of fear remained a consistent component throughout all of the interviews. I
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found fear to be a dominant precursor and motivator for the voting behavior of my
respondents. I also found that among my respondents who did not vote or voted third
party, fear is assumed to be the motivator behind the reasons other Muslim Americans
voted.
Methodological Limitations
As a convenience sample, my respondents are subject to selection bias in that they
were individuals who wanted to talk about their 2016 voting behavior. There are many
more respondents who declined to be interviewed and expressed anxiety about the
political nature of my project. Several Muslims told me that since Trump had already
won they saw no reason to discuss the topic. Another limitation is that my respondents
are more highly educated than the average Muslim American and therefore inclined to be
more politically informed.
RESULTS
Fear Moved the Vote
16 respondents (73 percent) cast a Democratic vote for Hillary Clinton during the
2016 presidential election. For the respondents who voted for Hillary Clinton, the clearest
and most consistent pattern which emerged is references to the social emotion of fear
either directly or indirectly by 13 of the 16 respondents. Consider the narrative of Mona,
a 39 year old corporate professional who stated: “I voted for Hillary Clinton because
quite simply, I could not vote for Trump. I couldn’t. Not with what was going on with the
hate and the fear.” When I ask her to explain what she means by ‘hate and fear’, she
further explained: “Because I think Trump says or said out loud things that no one had
the guts to say... And here comes this person who didn’t care and he said whatever he
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wanted. I think Muslims hearing that out loud were like ‘Holy Crap’ [Laughs] we can’t
let this happen. We can’t let this be who our leader is!’” Her sentiments are mirrored by
Tarek, a 26 year old artist. Tarek was a first-time voter who previously told me that he
tried to stay out of politics but felt compelled to participate in the 2016 election. He
stated: “I voted for Hillary Clinton because she was less scary than Trump.” When I
asked him what he meant by “scary”, he explained: “Trump was inspiring a lot of hate
and inspiring fascism and neo-Nazism. I mean, we are seeing this happening now, with
the rise in hate crimes.” Both Mona and Tarek shifted from using the first-person
pronoun when describing their individual action of voting to using a third-person pronoun
when they explained the reason they voted. Both referred, either directly or indirectly to
anti-Muslim sentiment. Mona explicitly stated: “Trump says or said out loud things that
no one had the guts to say… ” Similarly, Tarek refers to anti-Muslim sentiment as a
factor when he stated “Trump was inspiring a lot of hate and inspiring fascism and neoNazism...” This anti-Muslim sentiment is referred to as the direct cause of Mona’s “hate
and fear” and is clearly implied as the reason why Tarek described Trump as “scary”.
Anti-Muslim sentiment was a “moral disrupter” which sent emotion signals of fear and
anxiety which caused respondents to feel threatened and alarmed. As a result they were
motivated to vote. Consider the narrative of Rabia, a corporate attorney:
Islam was being politicized in this campaign, whereas other times we never felt –
I mean "victimized" is a strong word, but we never felt so victimized… Before we
didn't feel like we are under the microscope and we can just live our values as an
American. But now our values as a Muslim are being investigated. Yeah. I think,
for me, and I know, as an attorney, I know what the potential is. And I've always
wanted to exercise my right to vote. For me it's still fear because I know what the
possibilities are. I mean the Japanese internment camps were never ruled
unconstitutional. It is still part of the plan? – Rabia
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Rabia had previously explained that she had been voting since 2000. She had also
explained that she politically identified as an “independent” who votes “across party lines
depending on the issues”. She voted for Bush in 2000 and 2004. She only began voting
for the Democratic Party when Obama ran in 2008 and 2012. As she explained her 2016
vote, she shifted between first-person narrative and third-person narrative stating “we
never felt so victimized” and “our values as a Muslim are being investigated” but then
states “I’ve always wanted to exercise my right to vote”. She also referenced a perceived
threat of “internment camps”. Aaliya, is a 35 year old Medical professional who has also
been voting since 2000. Unlike Rabia, Aaliya, has consistently voted for the Democratic
Party, beginning with Al Gore. Yet, like Rabia, she identifies as an independent who
votes based on the qualifications of the candidates. She provided the following
explanation for her 2016 vote:
I voted for Hillary. I thought she was the better candidate. You know, she
wasn’t my first choice. I thought she was the better candidate. Because of
all the stuff that Trump was saying… you know ‘ban the Muslims’ and
stuff like that. It feels like with all this stuff, anti-Muslim stuff, people
realize that okay we are not accepted. We are trying to be accepted into
this society but the people are rejecting us. Muslims were like ‘oh this is
going to affect me, I need to get out there and vote and let my voice be
heard’. Muslims were afraid… afraid of the backlash, you know… afraid
of just living in this country and being discriminated against. Afraid of
things going backwards, of America returning to the Right.-Aaliya
Aaliya stated that she felt Hillary Clinton “was the better candidate”. However,
she then mentioned Trump’s anti-Muslim rhetoric: “all the stuff that Trump was
saying…you, ‘ban the Muslims’ and stuff like that”. Like my other respondents,
she then shifted to third-person, referring to Muslims as a collective group:
“Muslims were like ‘oh this is going to affect me, I need to get out there and vote
and let my voice be heard’”. Like Rabia, Aaliya, referenced fear. While
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Rabia mentions internment camps, Aaliya’s fear is less concrete and described as
“discrimination” and “backlash”.
The next two narratives are from two first-time voters. Both are 22 year
old female college students. Both are second-generation Muslims. Dania is an
Arab-American while Tehseen is of South Asian heritage. Dania wears a
headscarf which visibly identifies her as a Muslim while Tehseen has recently
removed hers. The narratives share the same pattern of shifting from a first-person
narrative to third-person narrative, while citing anti-Muslim rhetoric and
perceived threats to safety and freedom:
I voted for Hillary Clinton because there is huge Islamophobic and racist
sentiments behind what Trump was saying. And you can see that with the
jump in hate crimes not only against Muslims, against black people,
against gays, against Jewish people. I think that really shook up the
Muslim community because more and more we're hearing stories of our
friends and family being targeted, being shouted at, verbally abused, and
verbally attacked. …maybe two months apart I heard two of my closest
friend being verbally attacked, and that scared the crap out of me to the
point that I was like, "Mom, I think it's time to get you a gun." -Dania
I voted for Hillary Clinton, because when Bernie Sanders lost the
primaries, it was between Trump and Hillary… and Trump hated
immigrants and refugees and anyone who was not straight and male and
white, so I went ahead and voted for Hillary. I do not think that Muslims
realized how much the Right hated Muslims. I mean, we knew it, but we
did not know how strong it was. But this time, during the election, it really
showed. I mean, you saw the percentage of Hate Crimes go up. Muslims
had people coming up to them and telling them ‘go back to your country’.
The elections really badly emotionally affected actual Muslim citizens.
Muslims wanted to stand up for themselves and vote against hate.-Tehseen
Both young women refer to anti-Muslim sentiment when explaining their vote for
Hillary Clinton. Dania specifically refers to “huge Islamophobic and racist
sentiments” while Tehseen explains that “Trump hated immigrants and refugees
and anyone who was not straight and male and white”. They both discuss
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collective fear. Dania describes a Muslim community that is “shook up” while
Tehseen says that Muslims have been “badly emotionally affected”.
Unlike Dania and Tehseen, Ayesha is not a student, nor is she a first-time
voter. She is a medical professional who identifies as a Democrat and previously
voted for Obama. Yet she gave a strikingly similar narration as other respondents.
She stated:
I voted for the least of the evils. Neither of the candidates were qualified,
but better one than the other from the choices we were offered. Well,
obviously the media brought to our attention that there's the possibility of
somebody coming into power who would deny some of the basic rights
that this country is built upon. And I think people got concerned, people
got scared, and people voted because they wanted to do everything they
could in their power to prevent it. He was threatening the Muslim
community. It's a melting pot. It's United States. Our religion has
everybody of different races, and countries. And this is the first candidate
who would openly basically feed hatred to the general population. So I
think Muslims got scared – Ayesha
Despite identifying as a Democrat, Ayesha was not a fan of Hillary Clinton as a
candidate, referring to her as “the least of the evils”. Ayesha mentions that Trump
was “threatening the Muslim community” and “people got scared, people got
concerned”.
In all of these narratives, the respondents refer to a fear that has directly
resulted from anti-Muslim sentiment. They also refer to what they perceive as real
and tangible threats. For clarification, I have broken down the preceding 7
narratives to illustrate how these narratives fit into the theoretical model that I
outlined in Figure 3:
Moral Disrupters (Anti-Muslim Sentiment)
“Trump says or said out loud things that no one had the guts to say”- Mona
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“Trump was inspiring a lot of hate and inspiring fascism and neo-Nazism.”- Tarek
“Islam was being politicized in this election”- Rabia
“All the stuff that Trump was saying, ‘ban the Muslims’ and stuff like that”Aaliya
“There is huge Islamophobic and racist sentiments behind what Trump was
saying”- Dania
“I do not think that Muslims realized how much the Right hated Muslims. I mean,
we knew it, but we did not how strong it was. But this time, during the election it
really showed”- Tehseen
“This is the first candidate who would openly basically feed hatred to the general
population”- Ayesha
Emotion Signals (Grief, Anger, Outrage, Fear)
“I could not vote for Trump. I couldn’t. Not with what was going on with the hate and the
fear.”- Mona
“…she was less scary than Trump”- Tarek
"…victimized" is a strong word, but we never felt so victimized”- Rabia
“Muslims were afraid… afraid of the backlash”- Aaliya
“I think that really shook up the Muslim community”- Dania
“The elections really badly emotionally affected actual Muslim citizens”- Tehseen
“I think people got concerned, people got scared” – Ayesha
Emotion Processing (Muslim identity becomes more salient as the identity targeted)
“Muslims hearing that out loud were like ‘Holy Crap’” – Mona
“…we are seeing this happening now, with the rise in hate crimes.”- Tarek
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“…our values as a Muslim are being investigated”-Rabia
“We are trying to be accepted into this society but the people are rejecting us. “-Aaliya
More and more we're hearing stories of our friends and family being targeted, being
shouted at, verbally abused, verbally attacked.”- Dania
“I do not think that Muslims realized how much the Right hated Muslims. I mean, we
knew it, but we did not know how strong it was. But this time, during the election, it
really showed.”- Tehseen
“He was threatening the Muslim community. It's a melting pot. It's United States. Our
religion has everybody of different races, and countries.”- Ayesha
Cognitive Adjustment (Individual considers threat based on group identity)
“[Laughs] we can’t let this happen. We can’t let this be who our leader is”- Mona
“We’re seeing this now with the rise in hate crimes”- Tarek
“I know what the possibilities are. I mean the Japanese internment camps were never
ruled unconstitutional. Is it still part of the plan?” – Rabia
“…afraid of the backlash, you know… afraid of just living in this country and being
discriminated against. Afraid of things going backwards, of America returning to the
Right”-Aaliya
“More and more we're hearing stories of our friends and family being targeted, being
shouted at, verbally abused, …verbally attacked.”-Dania
“…you saw the percentage of Hate Crimes go up. Muslims had people coming up to
them and telling them ‘go back to your country’. -Tehseen
“The media brought to our attention that there's the possibility of somebody coming into
power who would deny some of the basic rights that this country is built upon.”- Ayesha
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Rational Action
The respondents voted.
These respondents are clear in explaining how anti-Muslim sentiment inspired
feelings of fear, anxiety and ‘victimization’. They describe feeling threatened by
internment camps, physical and verbal attacks, ‘backlash’, and losing basic human rights.
As a result, these respondents voted. Similar rationales for voting for Hillary Clinton can
be found in 13 narratives.
Several of my respondents did not directly discuss fear, yet they referred to
perceived threats to the safety of other Muslims, even when they had not been personally
threatened themselves. Ahmed and Mahmoud are my only male respondents who are
first-generation naturalized citizens. Both men are Palestinian immigrants with
entrepreneurial careers and neither man could recall an incident in which they felt
personally discriminated against or profiled and yet they still voted for Hillary Clinton.
Consider their narratives:
I didn’t feel good about either of the choices, but Trump had his way of targeting
Muslims. Say he wants to ban the Muslims, he wants to put more locks on
Mosques…there was really nothing new with what Trump was saying but he was
more outspoken. I voted for Hillary because Trump is not for the Muslims. And
that whole cabinet around him- they aren’t fit to be selected- Mahmoud
I had to vote for Hillary of course. The reason why is because it was clear that
Trump was not fair to Muslims. Trump was dangerous- IS dangerous to
Muslims, you know?- Ahmed
Mahmoud stated that “Trump is not for the Muslims” and that Trump’s cabinet were not
“fit to be selected”. However, Mahmoud also mentioned that Trump has a way of
“targeting” Muslims that Trump wants to “ban” the Muslims and put “locks on Mosque”
which clearly demonstrated that Mahmoud perceived Trump as a threat to the safety of
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Muslim people and to the sanctity of Islamic religious institutions. Similarly, Ahmed
explained that he voted for Hillary Clinton because Trump was and is “dangerous”. When
I asked Ahmed to explain why he thinks Trump is “dangerous”, he responded by asking
me “Do you see how many mosques are getting burned? How many sisters who are
getting their head covers pulled off?” Unlike these two men 22 year old college student
Jannah did mention incidents in which she felt personally discriminated against and she
also mentioned the attacks on head covers when she explained her vote for Hillary
Clinton.
I voted with my friends. Of course I voted for Hillary. With Trump, it is like
rednecks were attacking Muslim girls, pulling off their hijabs and attacking them.
But we never thought that he could win. –Jannah
As a Muslim female who wears the head scarf, Jannah’s stated motivation for voting
shows that she perceived a Trump presidency as a threat to her personal safety based on
past incidents of discriminations that she had personally experienced, as well as actions
that she had heard about happening to other Muslim women. 37 year old Salwa told me
that she has always voted Democrat and that she believed that Hillary Clinton was clearly
the better candidate. Yet, like Jannah she also mentioned fear for her personal safety. She
explained:
I voted for Hillary because she was clearly the better candidate. And with
Trump… well he has given people a license to attack us openly… like unabashed.
No one is afraid to be ugly… to have ugly opinions and to say horrific things that
20 years ago people weren’t allowed to say… but now people will say anything…
people will do anything. I have this innate fear of what’s to come. - Salwa
Fear remained an undercurrent in the narratives of all my respondents, no matter
how they voted or what reasons they cited. 26 year old graduate student Omar recited a
laundry list of reasons that he voted for Hillary Clinton. He stated:
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First of all, normally I am a liberal person, so it would be really irregular for me
to vote for a Republican. And I mean… Hillary Clinton had so much experience.
She was a senator. She was the First Lady. She was Secretary of State. As Barrack
Obama said there has been no man or woman who has had more experience to be
President of the United States. It did not take much to just look at her with a
critical eye and decide that she was the best candidate. – Omar
I immediately asked him how he felt about the outcome of the 2016 election and without
hesitation he stated “I’m scared for the rest of the country. And I am more scared for my
Muslim brothers and sisters. I am more scared for them than I am for myself. Because I
am white. I can blend in.” Omar’s sentiments were shared by Mahdi who also extensively
explained that he voted for Hillary Clinton because she was the better candidate. Like
Omar, Mahdi mentioned fear, but unlike Omar he seemed to have no hope of blending in.
When I asked how he felt about the outcome of the 2016 election, he stated: “I am scared.
I think I should move to Mexico.”
As for the remaining 6 respondents, 2 voted for third party candidate Jill Stein, 4
respondents did not vote at all. Of those 4 respondents 2 respondents explained that they
could not vote for either candidate in good conscious while 2 stated that because
Tennessee was a red state they did not feel that that their vote would count. Sheyla, a 38
year old housewife assured me that she had the sincere intention of voting for Hillary
Clinton, but explains how fear kept her from the voting booth:
I had every intention of voting. I got dressed and got in my car and drove all the
way there and everything. The voting station was just around the corner from my
house. But as I got closer I saw that the traffic was so backed up. Then I got
scared and I started to have a panic attack. I realized that I am a visibly Muslim
woman wearing a headscarf that is about to go to a voting booth in a
predominately white, suburban country area… and Tennessee is a red state so I
realized my vote would not matter anyway. It just was not worth it to me to take
that risk. – Sheyla
Non-Partisan and Ideologically Conservative:
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As noted earlier, one of the most consistently important predictors of voting
behavior was found to be party identification (Campbell 1964; Sinclair 2012; Achen and
Bartels 2016). Thus, I asked my respondents how they politically identified. My results
for party identification are consistent with the findings of Barreto and Bozonelos (2009)
who found a high number of Muslim American respondents (25 percent) who identified
as ‘none’ when asked which party best represents them. Barreto and Dana’s (2010) study
found that Muslim Americans who did not identify with any political party were less
likely to vote, however this was not the case with my respondents. In my study, only 6
respondents (23 percent) identified with the Democratic Party. The overwhelming
majority (14 respondents; 64 percent) identified as ‘non-partisan’, or none, yet 10 of
these respondents voted for Hillary Clinton. 2 respondents (9 percent) identified as
Independent or Third-party voters. One respondent reported being a registered
Republican until 2004. This respondent is now non-partisan. The responses below
exemplify the respondents’ explanations.
I don’t know if I would call myself a Democrat. I would call myself nonpartisan, I
think I would just call myself a person that sees. I actually am really not a fan of
this whole party system. I kind of feel like we should just see people’s values on
their own individual basis. -Irfan
I do not identify with any party. I just cannot fully align with either. Muslims
have certain ideals that align with Democrats and certain ideals that align with
Republicans. – Sheyla

When asked which political party asked held ideologies or values which best represented
Islamic values and ideologies 12 respondents (55 percent) gave narrations which implied
that despite congruencies between Islamic values and conservative ideologies, that there
was simply no option for Muslim Americans to vote for the Republican Party in the
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current political climate. This finding adds insight to previous studies which mark the
dramatic shift away from the Republican Party which began in 2004 (Ayers 2006;
Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Barreto and Dana 2010). My oldest respondent, 54 year old
Ahmed who has been voting for the past 20 years, actually referenced the 2000 election
in his response:
Well, I think that Republicans are always against Muslims…and I remember that
the Muslims voted for George W. Bush in 2000 because we thought he was for
the Muslims. But he turned on us, so we switched on him, even though the
democrats believe in a lot of stuff that Muslims don’t agree with- the LGBT stuff,
the birth rights stuff… but Democrats serve minorities and since we are
considered a minority I feel like that’s where we should be.. even though I guess
we share more with Republicans… the Christian Republicans, being, you know,
conservative, but I feel like the democrats is a better pace to be, the only place we
can be. – Ahmed
Other respondents gave similar narrations:
I do believe that we are more aligned with Republican values, but
Muslims are being pushed out of the Republican Party more so than
aligning necessarily with the Democrats. I mean if you did not have this
vilification of the Muslims thing that’s going on in both the media and
politics, I think that you would have Muslims who vote Republican and
Muslims that vote Democrat… but Muslims are pushed out and they’re
vilified and you know, they run their campaign on fighting Islamic
terrorism and bombing Muslim countries…that obviously turns Muslim
voters away. They’re not going to vote for a party that actively calls for
profiling them, spying on them etcetera… -Nasser
Well, that is kind of a deep question. Well, there are conflicts with both
parties, but we are looking at the overall pictures. There is not going to be
a perfect ideology, but the Democrats accept the Muslims whereas the
Republican people don’t. - Ayesha
22 year old Jannah was more abrupt:
Muslims want to act like conservatives. They are anti-gay, anti-abortion,
anti-this, anti-that… Pro family values, rich and live like white people
conservatives. They are racist, don’t like black people, don’t like
Mexicans, but the Republicans don’t want them. - Jannah
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Other respondents remarked that they perceived Islam as a conservative religion
which held ideologies and values which conflict with the liberal politics of the
Democratic Party. The most common issue of conflict mentioned was Democratic
support for gay marriage and abortion. 18 out of 22 respondents (82 percent) mention
support for gay marriage and abortion being an issue of contention between Islamic
values and Democratic ideals.
Yes, there is a conflict between Islam and Democrats… I feel like they are too
liberal, if that’s the right term… Some of the things that Republicans talk about
are more conservative and we are more conservative like on issues of gay
marriage, abortion and stuff like that… -Aaliya
Democrats tend to support gay marriage, homosexual marriage, and I think a lot
of Muslims are kind of like, Islam does not support such things. All monotheistic,
Abrahamic faiths are opposed to homosexuality… like conservative Christianity
is against homosexuality and abortion… and Muslims have those same beliefs… Abdul
The more we look at the background of the Republican and Democratic Party,
like, Republicans are a lot more conservative, which falls in line with a lot of the
Muslim ideals, as far as like we’re more of a conservative religion, whereas
Democrats are more liberal…there is like conflict with Democrats, as far as like
when you talk about like homosexuality, abortion, stuff like that… -Ameer
A lot of liberals don’t believe in religion at all or they are anti-religion which is
not good for Muslims… also they tend to be pro-choice and support abortion.
They’re loose on alcohol laws. They’re loose on drug laws. They want to
disestablish marriage and give open reign to homosexuality and LGBTQ rights….
I believe we fall in line more with conservative values because their values are
equal to us. We believe in male/female relationships to be centric to the family
unit, family units are centric to the community units, community units are central
to societal units… and that goes hand in hand with Republican values which stem
from conservative Christianity… -Musa
26 year old Musa, one of 4 nonvoters, expressed hope that the Muslim American
community would eventually be able to mend their relationship with the
Republican Party and Christian conservatives:
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Look, we fall in line more with conservative Republican values because their
values are equal to us. We believe in male/female relationships to be centric to the
family unit, family units to be centric to the community units, community units to
be central to societal units. And that’s something that goes hand in hand with
Republican values which stem from conservative Christianity and evangelicalism.
Even though they might be outright against Islam more so than liberals… I think
if we were to mend relationships with the Christian community you know, not
that we’re like buddy-buddy but to the point that I understand where they’re
coming from and they understand where we’re coming from and they can
understand Muslims are not here in America to take over, or you know, replace
American law with Sharia law or anything like that. If we can show them that I
think we could work together a lot more with the Republicans and the Christian
conservatives- Musa
Other respondents gave more nuanced explanations as exemplified in the following
narratives:
So Muslims have this interesting conundrum between the Democrats and the
Republicans because Muslims beliefs are more in line with the Republican
Conservatism when its home. But in terms of foreign policy, social justice, and
humanity, Muslims much more agreement with the Democratic side of the
spectrum. –Irfan
I think people think that they are more conservative and would probably align
themselves more with Republicans. I disagree. So I can't say. I don't feel I've
studied Islam enough to say what the Quran says, but – so I'm really basing this
off what I’ve heard and what I've grown up with learning. But I can’t see how we
can say to people that we believe in separation of church and state and we're not
here to shove our religion down anyone's throat or whatever, but then agree not
agree with pro-choice or be completely pro-life, things like that. So I think if you
talk to Islamic scholars, they're gonna tell you that they're pro-life. But I feel
living in this country that's not necessarily the Islamic way to make that – I think
as Muslims, even in this country, we should make that distinction of our religion.
And what I would do personally versus what as a country we're gonna allow
legally... So I feel Islamic values might lean liberal in terms of social welfare and
helping the poor and Medicare and Medicaid and Social Security, things like that.
But they're not gonna lean liberal when it comes to gay rights, LGBTQ and prochoice, pro-life-type things. So I think we're the real liberal versus conservative.
There's always gonna be this, "I agree with helping people, but I can't – I don't
agree with this or that." And I think that you have to say I either am liberal and I
agree with people's rights or not. You can't say, "I believe this country should give
us rights –" and along with rights means I have the right to practice as a Muslim.
– Mona
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You know what? Everyone has a right to believe what they're believing. So that's
where I see the distinction. I'm not an expert on Islam and I can't say one favors
Islam favors one ideology of a particular Party over another. I think it’s a
personal choice and it just depends on what you choose to focus on. But at the
same time I think Islam, for me, its biggest aspect in politics is about justice,
including justice in politics. That's what I remember about our Prophet – peace be
upon him. That’s what I remember about him the most, is that he would look at all
the issues and try to create the most just result, and so that's what I identify with.Rabia
Mahmoud, a Palestinian business owner who became an American citizen in 2014, had
harsh words for the Republican Party, however like many other respondents, he
mentioned the conflict with the Democratic Party on the issue of homosexuality.
Democrats allow you to do whatever you want to do basically. If you want to be
gay, you, you can be gay. Islamically we're not allowed to be gay, but there are
some open values. But since we all live in a society like United State, the gay
groups associate with Muslims more than Republicans. So in order for us to excel,
we have to accept what's around us, but not to be part of it in any way. Personally,
the Republican people that I know, they all identify them self as religious people,
yet they don't believe in having healthcare to help the poor. They think that the
poor has to go to work. If they need assistance, they have to go through the church
or their religious institution only. I disagree with that sentiment. I did work with
the poor people, and I've seen people who are trying to make it and they just
cannot. . When you're a single lady with three kids that make minimum wage, it
becomes so difficult. So that's one of the main reasons I associate with the
Democratic Party. - Mahmoud

Beverly, my second oldest respondent at 50, and one of 2 third party voters, provided this
spirited answer:
Well, I think most Muslims think that the Republicans are conservative -whatever
that’s supposed to mean. You can fill in the blanks with whatever is in your
imagination. They are fiscal conservative, social conservatives for big business.
That’s their propaganda. I don’t know what their literal platform is, which is
embarrassing to say I don’t know. And the Democrats are supposed to be for the
downtrodden, I mean that is their image whether it’s true or not is to be debated.
Oh, and the Republicans are kind of homogeneous and the Democrats are
supposed to be more progressive, more for social programming and social welfare
and peace and all that stuff. So I don’t know which party represents Muslims
values because I’ve never examined what their platform is in writing. I’ve been
manipulated and herded like everyone else- Beverly
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These responses clearly show that out of 22 respondents, 22 respondents (100 percent)
did not see Islamic values accurately represented in either political party, even if they
personally identified as a Democrat. This supports previous research which indicates that
partisan identification is not a factor in voter choice for Muslim Americans (Ayers 2007;
Barreto and Bozonelos 2009; Barreto and Dana 2010). Nevertheless, 16 respondents (73
percent) cast a Democratic vote for Hillary Clinton during the 2016 presidential election.
4 respondents did not vote at all. 2 respondents voted for third party candidate Jill Stein.
Table 5 details how each of my respondents politically identified and how they voted
during the 2016 election.
Of 14 respondents who identified as non-partisan or none in describing their party
affiliation, 10 respondents (71 percent) cast a vote for Hillary Clinton anyway. In my
efforts to determine the driving motivation behind why a majority of my respondents
voted for Hillary Clinton despite inconsistent affects for partisanship, I also interrogated
my respondent’s self-reported degree of religiosity and their relationship to their mosque
in an effort to establish evidence of group consciousness. I found inconsistent results.
Group Consciousness: A Gendered Divide
Research on the role of religion in political participation demonstrate a connection
between participation in the individual’s religious community and partisanship
(Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Ayers 2007). Thus, I
also searched for patterns that would indicate that my respondents had gained a sense of
group consciousness and affective attachment to their mosque communities. When
discussing mosque participation a striking gender divide emerged between male and
female narratives, displaying an extreme dichotomy between self-expressed emotional
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attachment and participation in the mosque community, with male respondents
expressing positive sentiments and female respondents responding negatively or
dismissively.
Table 5: List of Participants and How They Voted
Pseudonym
Abdul
Ahmed
Aliyah
Ameer
Ayesha
Beverly
Dania
Irfan
Jannah
Mahdi
Mahmoud
Mona
Musa
Nadia
Nasser
Omar
Rabia
Salwa
Sharif
Sheyla
Tarek
Tehseen

Partisan Identification
Non-Partisan
None
None
None
Democrat
Third-Party
None
Non-Partisan
None
Democrat
Democrat
Democrat
None
Third-Party
None
Non-Partisan
Non-Partisan
Democrat
None
None
None
Democrat

How they voted
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
None
Hillary Clinton
Jill Stein
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
None
Jill-Stein
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton
None
None
Hillary Clinton
Hillary Clinton

I asked my respondents how religious they considered themselves to be and I
asked them to describe their relationship with their mosque community. 8 of my 11 male
participants believed themselves to be “religious”, “very religious” or “orthodox” and 10
respondents spoke positively about their participation in the mosque community. 3 of my
male respondents are clergy members and 2 of my male respondents are youth group
leaders. Thus, it could be expected that these 5 respondents would consider themselves
religious and be exceptionally involved in their mosques as community leaders. These 5
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respondents would also be expected to narrate a positive account of their relationship
with their mosque communities. However, 10 out 11 males, irrespective of self-reported
degrees of religiosity narrated affective attachments to their mosque as exemplified in the
following narratives:
I would consider myself a religious Muslim. My life is Islam-centered. I
go to the mosque, say two or three times a week these days. I try to go
more, as it’s hard to balance with my work, and then my studies, and then
my extracurricular activities. But I like to go as much as possible. I really
like going to the mosque. I am really happy Ramadan is coming because
then I will probably go there every day. I would love to be there all the
time. I know everyone in the mosque. I know their names, I know their
faces. I’m knowing kind of everybody which is nice. So it's it is actually
central. Something important to my life. –Abdul
I consider myself very religious and I contribute to my mosque in every
aspect. I volunteer with my skills, with my money, with my knowledge.
And not just one mosque, I’m involved in all the mosques in Memphis. I
love seeing the brothers and getting together with them in the mosque.
We talk about politics, current events and sometimes just have coffee
together. –Mahmood
Even Omar, who had previously stated to me that he considered himself to be a
“very liberal person” also told me that he considers himself an “orthodox
Muslim”. He stated:
Well I would consider myself orthodox Muslim. The Muslim community
is wonderful and I love it here in Memphis. I really like all the different
mosques here. I haven’t been to every single one, but I’ve been to five or
six of them. I really like them a lot. I live close to two of them. I go mostly
to the one here by the University of Memphis. I like the people there. The
people are really nice from all over the country, smart people, university
people and everything and professionals and I like the mosque near
Summer Ave. It’s a different community there. And I really like both
types of community. That one is more family, you know, younger children
and it’s also diverse but it’s a different demographic I think. I pray 5 times
a day and I spend as much time as I can in the mosque. - Omar
Even male respondents who did not consider themselves to be religious spoke positively
about their relationship with their mosque communities. Tarek states:
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I try to be religious, but I don’t know. I don’t want to call myself religious. But I
try to go to the mosque as much as I can. Sometimes I go there between classesto the mosque that is close to the University. I might take a nap there or study
there. It’s peaceful and quiet. On Sundays me and my friend go pray fajr at
Masjid-Rahman. I leave the house at 4:30 am to pick him up. It’s something that
I look forward to every week. – Tarek
Only Ahmed, my oldest respondent at 54, gave a more negative answer. However, even
Ahmed stated that he goes to the mosque once a day. He explained:
I am mediocre religious. I am not going either way too extreme. You know, to the
extreme of being liberal or to the extreme of being strict religious. I go to the
mosque once a day, you know. I used to volunteer in there but in the last few
years, I guess with the structure of the community and the politics of the mosque,
that kind of made me stop. I don’t want to deal with any of that. - Ahmed
22 year old restaurant server Mahdi is the only respondent who did not provide a positive
reply, however he was not negative ether. His reply is more ambiguous.
Uh, I’m not religious. I got some things I need to work on. I pray and stuff. I go to
the mosque on Fridays because all guys are supposed to go to the mosque on
Fridays. It’s important to my dad, I guess. I pop in and I pop out. – Mahdi
Although Mahdi is ambiguous in his response regarding the relationship he has with the
mosque, he held a very positive perspective about the mosque’s role in the voter
mobilization. Thus I find that 10 out of 11 of the male respondents have a relatively
positive outlook on their mosque community. Former volunteer Ahmed is the only one
who was vaguely negative, and yet he still attends the mosque once a day. In contrast,
female respondents narrate drastically different perceptions from their male counterparts.
7 out of my 11 female respondents(64 percent) described themselves as ‘religious’ or
‘very religious’ and in one case ‘orthodox’. 4 out of my 11 female respondents (36
percent) said that they were ‘not religious’ or ‘not very religious. Unlike the male
respondents who maintained positive narratives about their mosques communities
irrespective of whether or not they described themselves as religious, female respondents
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expressed a negative relationship with their mosque even if they described themselves as
religious.
I consider myself very religious. I’m orthodox, but I do not really have a
relationship with the mosque. I kind of just want to go there and pray, and then go
home. You know, not get involved with whatever is going on there… I am just
saying that I am really disappointed in the mosque. Sometimes we’re like
supposed to be a community, but then I see just how people are hypocritical with
that, you know. We pretend that we are one. We’re like let’s show non-Muslims
our unity and let’s show non-Muslims us being together. But the racism in the
mosque, and the politics and the hypocrisy… You know, I’m like ‘let me just pray
and go home’. –Aaliya
Well, I would consider myself religious… considering… As of late, I do not go to
any of the mosques and I do not participate in the larger community because of
cultural patriarchy. Cultural patriarchy, politics, I guess that's the best word I can
use to explain that, politics and pecking orders and racism and sexism. I also
participated in- so pretty much a lot of the things that I participated as far as the
formal masjid setting I should say was the designated duties that they give for
women. And then, in those spaces it's not necessarily Islamic concept it's these
people. Its cultural practices. So things doing with children so I helped out with
Girl Scouts. I was one of the parent helpers. I never volunteered for anything else.
They put women on kitchen patrol. I don't do that stuff.
I don't like that stuff. -Beverly
I am religious compared to my friends. I wear hijab and I pray. I go to the mosque
every Friday with my family and I babysit there. I love the babies, but I don’t like
the mosque. I don’t like Arabs. Is it okay for me to say that? Arabs gossip too
much and for this reason I don’t consider the mosque the best place. Also there
are old-men perverts at the mosque. I was once told that I should not be walking
around in the parking lot. I’m like WHY? Because men old enough to be my
father might look at me?- Jannah
I guess I would consider myself religious, but I do not really go the masjid. I go
when my husband makes me- well, it’s not that he makes me… but he will insist.
Because the masjid is important to him and his idea of family. Especially here in
America. He wants his family in the masjid. But I feel very disconnected there.
None of the mosques have any female scholars. Even the ‘sister’s study circles are
overseen by men. It puts a sour taste in my mouth. I would rather not go because I
just always feel angry there. But I do it for my husband, because otherwise he will
worry about me that I am going astray. I do it to keep the peace -Sheyla,
I used to like going to the mosque when I was little, but when you get older you
start to think about it more. I find the mosque is a place where a lot of um… you
know… when people act one way inside and another way outside… like in the
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mosque people are rude and the women have to stay in the back. As I’ve gotten
older I don’t know how I feel about that anymore. Like… the way we act inside
the mosque compared to the way we act outside. And people aren’t friendly
except to ask you all kinds of questions... They’re nosey... All the old women.
And people pick on you for anything you do wrong, any mistake that you make.
And I used to like going to the mosque when I was little because all of my friends
were there. But we got older and they don’t go there anymore. I guess I still go
because I still try to be religious- Dania
Out of 11 female respondents, 9 (82 percent) expressed negative feelings toward their
mosque. In previous research studies, religious attendance and participation in religious
communities were shown to be a factor in political participation; however, there are no
consistent patterns in my study of Muslim Americans.
Beyond the Vote: Fear as a Mobilizer
I found that for my respondents the outcome they had feared had come into
fruition. All 22 respondents told stories of profiling or discrimination that had happened
to them or someone they knew. Consider the following narratives:
We are living in an environment where it kind of encouraged people to be racist
and discriminate against others. My sister works in a pharmacy and there is like
older white demographic. So she faced a lot of that discrimination like, working
in the pharmacy. Like people would come up and stuff, like, ask for somebody
else to help them or they'll be very rude… they will make certain derogatory
remarks about her hijab. She has been way more surrounded by those kind of
actions. Maybe with Muslim men they can hide, unless they have a beard or
something but for Muslim women, it’s more frightening. Muslim women are
more obvious so they get way more targeted.-Ameer
As a Muslim I am afraid. Muslims are all over the media, all over the national
news in a very negative light. Even when I am at my job I hesitate to say that I am
Muslim… I don’t want people to find out I am Muslim. I don’t cover my hair. I
do not pray in public… … like this one lady, I know she loved me, but once she
found I am Muslim everything changed. She is very racist and she says a lot of
rude things… and she is elderly so I can’t really change her thinking. This
climate has affected me negatively for sure. –Tehseen

48

Others were more specific and several expressed a desire for me not to include their story
as they were afraid of repercussions from their work place or employers. Rabia expressed
considerable anxiety before relating the following:
Ok…we were coming back from Canada. So we took our children to Canada, but
we were flying out of Seattle so we don't have to pay the international fees and
stuff. So we had a very long drive and we were driving early in the morning to
Seattle from Canada. And going through customs, we gave our passports to the
customs officer. And all my three boys were sleeping in the back, so they didn't
actually know this happened and I have not told them about this. But he said,
"Lower the window." I'm like, "Okay." So I lowered the window. The weather
was kind of cold, but they didn't wake up or – you know, they're in a deep sleep.
And he looked at them to verify that they are as the pictures on the passport. And
then he said to me, "Are you raising them to be suicide bombers?" My husband
just held my hand and said ‘don’t say anything’. And we just kept quiet. We were
terrified. He was waiting for a reaction. We didn’t give him one and lucked out. –
Rabia
For better or worse, emotion continues to shape the shared experiences of Muslim
Americans. Yet, my respondents were not entirely negative. 17 respondents comment on
what they view as positive outcomes which have resulted from Trump’s election and
noted the current mobilization of the Muslim community. What I have attempted to
account for with my theory of emotional-cognition is how the individual may make a
decision based on group identity in the absence of affective ties to the group. However, I
do not dismiss the abundancy of research which has shown that certain emotions can lead
to a sense of solidarity and group consciousness when those emotions are communicated
through a shared network (Snow and Soule 2010; Jasper 1997; 1998, 2003). My results
show that men have closer ties to the mosque than women do. However, women certainly
are part of family and friendship networks with other Muslims, and it could be argued
that this is where women gain a strong sense of group consciousness with the Muslim
American identity. I argue that the Muslim community is so heterogeneous that in the
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absence of macro-level forces which target Muslims, these individuals would be more
likely to integrate into their racial or ethnic community, or perhaps shed their cultural
identity entirely and meld into the mainstream American community. In any case, my
results indicate that emotion continues to act as a force which transcends a single
individual and is driving Muslim Americans toward political mobilization as exemplified
in the following narratives.
I think because this election more than any other election put Muslims on
a platform, whether negative or positive. It put Muslims on a platform and
you're coming into an age where there is like second generation, third
generation, four generation young Muslims coming in and they see that
being said and they don't like it and they want to be a part of the change to
make sure that they are accepted within society. Because this is their
home. Like, with first generation, probably they didn't care as much to be
that involved because they still – their minds were still like, oh, one day
I'll go back home or my home is overseas. Whereas us being born and
raised here, this is our home so we have to kind of speak up and talk about
– and the rise of Trump kind of brought the rise of Muslim
consciousness and like the political aspect because there was nobody that
ever kind of put us on the spotlight like that. -Ameer
This presidency is a big red flag, I think for the Muslims in the United States
because this is not really the image of American we- that I guess my parents had
when they came here, or what many Muslim Americans have. We came here, I
think most Muslims came here post-Civil Rights Movement, you know. We’re
organizing. We’re becoming more politically active- Abdul
I think since the election of Trump, there has been a huge coalition of
Muslim becoming politically active and protesting. Like what happened with the
gathering at the Civil Rights Museum. I've never before participated in such an
event, but it was a really moving event to see people from all minority
backgrounds get together. I think this is a really good sign to see people from
minority sides- all minority sides- all get together. And that’s how we will be able
to prevent stereotypes. Not to mention what we saw in the news, like how airports
closed for prayers and to watch non-Muslims surround the Muslims to pray. This
is – I don't think – if it wasn't for Trump, I don't think we would be getting
together like this. I don’t think we would be able to pray in front of the Civil
Right Museum. So there is good things that take place and because of that.
-Mahmoud

50

Muslims are becoming a big body of change. The Trump… Trump is
moving Muslims. People who never voted are voting and now they are
getting involved in protests… and in government also. And politicians
who did not pay attention to us are going to have to pay attention to us. –
Ahmed.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The one consistent pattern that emerged among my respondents was the implicit
and explicit discussion of fear. Fear was discussed at both the individual and the group
level as my respondents discussed anti-Muslim rhetoric, threats of bans, deportation, and
limits on human rights. When these respondents talked about the 2016 election, they used
collective pronouns ‘us’ and ‘we’, demonstrating that they saw themselves as part of the
larger collective group of Muslim Americans. My respondents felt individually
threatened as members of the group, and responded individually by casting a vote against
then-president elect Trump. Based on these patterns, I conceptualized a framework
which shows the interdependence of emotion and cognition to explain why individual
Muslims voted for Hillary Clinton in the absence of partisan identification, religious
participation, formal political organization and affective group attachment. I also found
that consistent with other research on social movements that my respondents view the
current political climate as a catalyst for continuing organization. I hold that macro-level
social structures can shape micro-level social psychological process by placing emphasis
on certain identities. For my respondents, this is the targeted ‘Muslim’ identity.
Despite previous literature which has highlighted the importance of partisan
identification (Campbell 1964; Sinclair 2012; Achen and Bartels 2016) on influencing
voter choice, partisan identity has no influence on the Muslim American voters in my
sample. Further, despite research on participation in religious institutions being a factor in
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political mobilization, (Ayers 2007; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Rosenstone and
Hansen 1993) this was also not a factor in my sample. Additionally, although Islamic
civic advocacy groups attributed the high rate of Muslim American voter participation to
the voter mobilization campaigns (Farivar 2016), none of my 22 respondents participated
in these campaigns. Of course, this is most likely due to the small number of my
respondents and the geographic location of my study. My data also could not determine
that group consciousness, or affective feelings toward a community identity played any
role in voter choice. I found that specifically women spoke of their community in a
negative way. They described a community plagued with gossip, racism, cultural
divisions, and misogyny. It could be argued that my female respondents, maintain
affective connections to their families and friends and shared emotional experiences are
communicated through these social networks. Additionally, social media may play a role
in fostering a collective group identity as many Muslim women are certainly connected to
other Muslim women through these means. Nevertheless, what I have attempted to
account for are factors which have led to the heightened salience of the Islamic identity in
the absence of affective ties to the larger group. My respondents are Muslim, but they are
also Black, White, Arab, Pakistani, Bengali, Malay, students, business owners,
professionals, and housewives. Furthermore, many of them, specifically women,
described themselves as non-religious.
This study contributes to existing literature in three key ways. Firstly, my study
offers a new theory of emotional-cognition to explain how an individual may respond
when a group the individual is associated with is consistently targeted through hate
rhetoric (moral disrupters) from macro-level social structures (hate rhetoric, media
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pundits, political policies etc.…) . Emotion signals of fear and anger can be sent which
underlines the individual’s association with such group (based on cultural, social or
demographic affiliation) which, in turn, propels the individual to act as a member of that
group, even in the absence of affective social network ties and formal mobilization. The
conceptualization of this theory is in response to previous literature which has been
inadequate to explain the voting behavior of Muslim Americans and possibly other
marginalized populations. Secondly, this study adds to previous literature on emotion and
voting behavior by finding that fear, specifically, can act as one micro-level sociopsychological factor which can affect voter turnout. Third, I have also contributed to the
limited research on the unique situation of Muslim Americans. It is the first qualitative
study on Muslim American voting behavior and the first study which has specifically
identified the social emotion of fear as the key driving factor. I anticipate that in the
absence of anti-Muslim sentiment (Bail 2015) the Muslim American vote would become
divided between racial, ethnic and socio-economic cleavages, as what has happened
between Black and White Christian congregations. (Harris 1999; Ayers 2006). The
findings of this study has implications for future studies on other marginalized
populations such as Latino immigrants or low-income African-American conservatives
who may otherwise be inclined to vote for the Republican Party but are compelled to vote
Democrat due to threatening rhetoric targeting their demographic group.
However, my study has some limitations. As a qualitative research sample, my
study was able to speak to directly to Barreto and Bozenolos (2009) as an existing more
comprehensive quantitative study, but future research is required. There needs to be a
larger sample collected which extends upon the Memphis Muslim community and
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expands across racial, ethnic and socioeconomic communities. A key drawback in my
sample is the lack of diversity in my sample. It would also be beneficial to replicate my
study in larger metropolitan cities that are more densely populated with Muslim
Americans, such as Dearborn Michigan, Washington D.C. or Dallas, Texas. Finally, it
would be useful to transform these findings into large scale quantitative survey
instruments which could provide a clearer and more comprehensive snapshot of the
sociological factors which are shaping the growing rate of Muslim American political
participation.
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Appendix A

Consent to Participate in a Research Study

How do Muslim Americans explain their political behavior?

WHY ARE YOU BEING INVITED TO TAKE PART IN THIS RESEARCH?
You are being invited to take part in a research study about Muslim American Political Behavior.
You are being invited to take part in this research study because you are a consenting adult who
has volunteered to share your experiences regarding your current and past voting behavior and
opinions on Muslim American political behavior. If you volunteer to take part in this study, you will
be of about 20-30 people to do so.

WHO IS DOING THE STUDY?
The person in charge of this study is JoAnna Boudreaux of University of Memphis Department of
Sociology. She can be contacted at Jbdreaux@memphis.edu. She is being guided in this
research by Dr.Junmin Wang. Dr.Wang can be contacted at Jwang4@memphis.edu. There
may be other people on the research team assisting at different times during the study.

WHAT IS THE PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY?
By doing this study, we hope to learn the motivations behind Muslim American voting behavior.

ARE THERE REASONS WHY YOU SHOULD NOT TAKE PART IN THIS STUDY?
This study is limited to Muslim Americans who are legally eligible to vote. You should not take
part of this study if you are under the age of 18. You should not take part of this study if you do
not identify as a Muslim American. You should not take part in this study if you are not legally
eligible to vote.

WHERE IS THE STUDY GOING TO TAKE PLACE AND HOW LONG WILL IT LAST?
You will have the choice to participate in either a face-to-face interview or a telephone interview. If
you choose to participate in the telephone interview, it is not within the researcher’s ability to
control the privacy within your physical location during the phone interview. The researcher will
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take all possible measures to secure privacy on her end of the line, however if you are engaging
in the telephone interview while grocery shopping, for example, the researcher will not be able to
control who might overhear the conversation.

If you elect to participate in face-to-face interview, you will have a choice of setting. A private
office on the University of Memphis campus will be available for interviews. If, however, you do
not feel comfortable participating on campus, the researcher is willing to meet you at a mutually
agreed upon safe, non-public, location. The one-time interview will take anywhere between 45
minutes to 1 hour.

WHAT WILL YOU BE ASKED TO DO?
You will be asked to answer questions about your past and current voting behavior, and the
reasons which motivated your decisions. No identifying information will be taken from you. You
will work with the Investigator to create a pseudonym (false name). This will serve as the only
identifier for you. With your permission, interviews will be recorded. No identifying questions, such
as real name or phone numbers, will be asked. The recordings will be stored in a locked file until
the end of the project, at which time they will be destroyed. Transcripts will be made for each
recording. You will be asked to fill out a short survey. If you are being interviewed over the phone,
this survey may be verbally completed. The survey and transcript will be kept in a separate
locked file from the audio recordings. Any identifying information that might come up during the
interview, such as a high school name or address will be replaced with a false name. An example
is instead of East High School, something along the lines of Urban High School or Rural High
School will be substituted.

WHAT ARE THE POSSIBLE RISKS AND DISCOMFORTS?
To the best of our knowledge, the things you will be doing have no more risk of harm than you
would experience in everyday life.
WILL YOU BENEFIT FROM TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
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You will not get any personal benefit from taking part in this study. However, your willingness to
take part, may, in the future, help society as a whole better understand the motivations behind the
behavior of Muslim Americans as a political group.
DO YOU HAVE TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY?
If you decide to take part in the study, it should be because you really want to volunteer. You will
not lose any benefits or rights you would normally have if you choose not to volunteer. You can
stop at any time during the study and still keep the benefits and rights you had before
volunteering.

IF YOU DON’T WANT TO TAKE PART IN THE STUDY, ARE THERE OTHER CHOICES?
If you do not want to be in the study, there are no other choices except not to take part in the
study.

WHAT WILL IT COST YOU TO PARTICIPATE?
There are no costs associated with taking part in the study.

WILL YOU RECEIVE ANY REWARDS FOR TAKING PART IN THIS STUDY?
You will not receive any rewards or payment for taking part in the study.

WHO WILL SEE THE INFORMATION THAT YOU GIVE?
We will make every effort to keep private all research records that identify you to the extent
allowed by law.

Your information will be combined with information from other people taking part in the study.
When we write about the study to share it with other researchers, we will write about the
combined information we have gathered. You will not be personally identified in these written
materials. We may publish the results of this study; however, we will keep your name and other
identifying information private.
We will make every effort to prevent anyone who is not on the research team from knowing that
you gave us information, or what that information is.
No identifying information will be taken from you. You will work with the Investigator to
create a pseudonym (false name), which will serve as the only identifier for you. With your
permission, interviews will be recorded, but no identifying questions, such as name or phone
numbers, will be asked.
The recordings will be stored in a locked file until the end of the project, at which time
they will be destroyed. Transcripts will be made for each recording, however; only a pseudonym
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(false name) will be used. Any identifying information that might come up during the interview,
such as a high school name or address will be replaced with a broad description. An example is
instead of East High School, something along the lines of Urban High School or Rural High
School will be substituted. You will have an option of telephone or face-to-face interviews. The
setting for face-to-face interviews will also be flexible within reason. For example, public spaces
such as coffee shops or restaurants that pose a risk of breaching privacy and confidentiality will
not be acceptable. These options allow you to choose a location that is comfortable and secure
both emotionally and confidentiality wise. If you opt for telephone interviews, the researcher
cannot control who might overhear the conversation on your end of the line. All measures will be
taken to secure privacy for you on the researcher’s end of the conversation.

We will keep private all research records that identify you to the extent allowed by
law. However, there are some circumstances in which we may have to show your information to
other people. For example, the law may require us to show your information to a court: or to tell
authorities if you report information about a child being abused or if you pose a danger to yourself
or someone else. Also, we may be required to show information which identifies you to people
who need to be sure we have done the research correctly; these would be people from such
organizations as the University of Memphis.

ARE YOU PARTICIPATING OR CAN YOU PARTICIPATE IN ANOTHER RESEARCH
STUDY AT THE SAME TIME AS PARTICIPATING IN THIS ONE?
You may take part in this study if you are currently involved in another research study. It is
important to let the investigator/your doctor know if you are in another research study.

WHAT HAPPENS IF YOU GET HURT OR SICK DURING THE STUDY?
It is important for you to understand that the University of Memphis does not
have funds set aside to pay for the cost of any care or treatment that might be necessary
because you get hurt or sick while taking part in this study. Also, the University of Memphis will
not pay for any wages you may lose if you are harmed by this study.
Medical costs that result from research related harm cannot be included as regular medical costs.
Therefore, the medical costs related to your care and treatment because of research related harm
will be your responsibility;
or may be paid by your insurer if you are insured by a health insurance company (you should ask
your insurer if you have any questions regarding your insurer’s willingness to pay under these
circumstances);
or may be paid by Medicare or Medicaid if you are covered by Medicare, or Medicaid (if you have
any questions regarding Medicare/Medicaid coverage you should contact Medicare by calling 1800-Medicare (1-800-633-4227) or Medicaid 1-800-635-2570.
Your insurer or Medicare/Medicaid may require a co-payment/deductible from you even if your
insurer or Medicare/Medicaid has agreed to pay the costs. The amount of this copayment/deductible may be substantial. You do not give up your legal rights by signing this form.
CAN YOUR TAKING PART IN THE STUDY END EARLY?
If you decide to take part in the study you still have the right to decide at any time that you no
longer want to continue. You will not be treated differently if you decide to stop taking part in the
study.
The individuals conducting the study may need to withdraw you from the study. This may occur if
you are not able to follow the directions they give you, if they find that your being in the study is
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more risk than benefit to you, or if the agency funding the study decides to stop the study early for
a variety of scientific reasons.
WHAT IF YOU HAVE QUESTIONS, SUGGESTIONS, CONCERNS, OR COMPLAINTS?
Before you decide whether to accept this invitation to take part in the study, please ask any
questions that might come to mind now. Later, if you have questions, suggestions, concerns, or
complaints about the study, you can contact the investigator, ____JoAnna Boudreaux____ at

______Jbdreaux@memphis.edu_____. You may also contact faculty advisor Dr. Junmin
Wang at Jwang4@memphis.edu

If you have any questions about your rights as a volunteer in this research, contact the
Institutional Review Board staff at the University of Memphis at 901-678-2705. We will give you a
signed copy of this consent form to take with you.

What happens to my privacy if I participate in a focus group?
All focus group participants are cautioned to keep what is said in the focus group private.
However, as the investigator, I cannot ensure that participants will keep what is said private.
What happens to my privacy if I am interviewed?
All respondents will be given a pseudonym and no identifiable information will be attached to the
data gathered. The data will be further stored in a password protected jump drive. Participation is
voluntary and the subject will be able to discontinue the interview at any time and any gathered
data will be destroyed.

_________________________________________
Signature of person agreeing to take part in the study

____________
Date

_________________________________________
Printed name of person agreeing to take part in the study
______JoAnna Boudreaux_______________________
Name of [authorized] person obtaining informed consent
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____________
Date
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Pseudonym : ________________________________
Race:__________
Age : _____________
Gender: _________
Marital Status: ______________
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APPENDIX C
DEMOGRAPHIC SURVEY
What is your religious denomination?
 Sunni (1)
 Shiite (2)
 Muslim (no designation) (3)
 Other (4)

Are you a convert to Islam?
 Yes (1)
 No (2)

Were you or your parents born somewhere that is not the United States?
 I was born elsewhere (1)
 My parents were born elsewhere (2)
 No, my family has been here a long time (3)

If you were born somewhere that is not the United States:
What is your country of origin?

If your parents born somewhere that is not the United States?
Where are your parents from?
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Which categories describe you? Mark all that apply.
 White (For example: German, English, Italian, Polish, Etc)
 Hispanic or Latino (For Example: Mexican, Puerto Rican, Salvadoran, Colombian,
Etc)
 Black or African American
 Black or African Caribbean (For example: Jamaican, Haitian, West Indies, Etc)
 Black or African (For example: Somali, Ghanaian, Nigerian, Ethiopian, Etc)
 Asian Pacific Islander (For Example: Chinese, Filipino, Vietnamese, Japanese, Etc.)
 South Asian (For Example: Indian, Pakistani, Bengali, Sri Lankin )
 Native American or Alaskan Native (For Example: Navajo Nation, Mayan, Nome
Eskimo, Etc.)
 Middle Eastern or North African (For Example: Lebanese, Syrian, Egyptian, Syrian,
Moroccan, Etc.)
 Native Hawaiian or Other Pacific Islander ( For Example: Samoan, Tongan, Fijian,
Native Hawaiian, Etc.)
 Some Other Race or Ethnicity

Out of the following selections, what best describes your level of income?







Less than $10,000
$10,000 - $19,999
$20,000 - $49,999
$50,000 - $79,999
$80,000 - $149,999
More than $150,000

What is the highest level of education you have completed?








Less than high school
High school graduate
Some college
2 year degree
4 year degree
Professional degree
Doctorate
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What is your marital status?






Married
Widowed
Divorced
Separated
Never married

What is your Age?






18 - 24
25 - 34
35 - 44
45 - 64
65 or older

What is your Sex?
 Male
 Female
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Appendix D
Interview Guide
General:
Tell me about yourself?
How would you describe your religious beliefs?

How would you describe your participation within your mosque community?
How would you describe what it is like to be a Muslim in America?
What do you like to do with your free time?
Political Behavior and Background

Did you vote in the 2016 election?
(If yes) Who did you vote for? Why?
(If yes) Did you vote in previous elections (why or why not?)
(If yes) In which elections did you previously vote and how did you
vote?
What impacted your decisions to vote (or not to vote) in previous
elections?
(If no) What made you decide to vote in the 2016 election for the first
time?
(If respondent did not vote) Why not? Have you voted in any previous
elections? Who did you vote for and why?
How do you feel about the outcome of the 2016 election?
(Based on response to the above)
Did you participate in any voting mobilization campaigning? Why? Why not? How do
you feel about these campaigns?
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How would you describe the influence of the media on impacting your decision to vote or
not to vote? How do you feel about the role of media in influencing voter decisions
during presidential elections?

Identity as a Muslim American :
What does being a Muslim American mean to you?
Do you feel that your fate is linked with other Muslim Americans?
How do you think most Americans view Muslims?
Do you think it is important for Muslim Americans to vote? Why or why not?
What impact has being a Muslim in America had on your political participation?
Do you think there have been positive impacts?
(Y) What kinds? Have there been any other positive impacts you can think of?
(N) Why do you think that is?
Do you think there have been negative impacts?
(Y) What kinds? Have there been any other negative impacts you can think of?
(N) Why do you think that is?

Can you describe any incidents of profiling or discrimination which have happened to
you or anyone you know since 9/11? Did these incidents influence your decision to vote?
Can you describe any incidents of vandalism or hostile acts which targeted a mosque or
Islamic school that you were made aware of? Did these incidents influence your decision
on either how you should vote or whether or not you should vote?
Political Attitudes
Which political party do you identify with?
Which political party do you think best represents Islamic values?
How would you describe the ideology of the Republican Party?
How does this ideology conflict/ agree with core Islamic values?
How would you describe the ideology of the Democratic Party?
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How does this ideology conflict/ agree with core Islamic values?
How would describe the national political climate in regards to Muslim Americans?
(better or worse over past decades)

Outlook/Opinion:
How do you feel about the future of Muslim American political participation?
Are there any questions that I did not ask you that you think might be helpful to future interviews
with Muslim Americans?
Were there any questions that you expected me to ask that I did not?
Is there anything else you would like to tell me about yourself, either in general or in regards to
your experiences as a Muslim American?
Thank you for your time and willingness to be interviewed.
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Appendix E

Volunteers Wanted for a Research Study

Study on the Political Behavior of Muslim
Americans
Purpose of study: We are seeking volunteers to participate in an interview regarding their
voting behavior as Muslim Americans. To participate in this study you must identify as a Muslim
American and be legally eligible to vote.

Procedure and duration: The interview is expected to take between forty-five minutes to two
hours. Participants will also be asked to complete a short survey requesting demographic
information. Participants will have the option of a face-face or a telephone interview.
Eligibility: All participants must be 18 years or older. Only participants that consider themselves
to be Muslim Americans and legally eligible to vote will be considered.
Contact: To volunteer, or to seek more information, please contact graduate student JoAnna
Boudreaux of the Department of Sociology by phone at 1-901-826-9680 or by email
Jbdreaux@memphis.edu
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Appendix F

Institutional Review Board
Office of Sponsored Programs
University of Memphis
315 Admin Bldg
Memphis, TN 38152-3370

Jan 27, 2017

PI Name: JoAnna Boudreaux
Co-Investigators: Wesley James, Seth Abrutyn
Advisor and/or Co-PI: Junmin Wang
Submission Type: Initial
Title: How do Muslim Americans explain their voting behavior?
IRB ID : #PRO-FY2017-230

Expedited Approval: Jan 27, 2017
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Expiration: Jan 27, 2018

Approval of this project is given with the following obligations:

1. This IRB approval has an expiration date, an approved renewal must be in effect to
continue the project prior to that date. If approval is not obtained, the human
consent form(s) and recruiting material(s) are no longer valid and any research
activities involving human subjects must stop.

2. When the project is finished or terminated, a completion form must be submitted.

3. No change may be made in the approved protocol without prior board approval.

Thank you,
James P. Whelan, Ph.D.
Institutional Review Board Chair
The University of Memphis.
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